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Comments on Current Issues
Editor's Note
In addition to being outstanding scholars in their fields, the authors of this paper have served as
expert witnesses for the United States and/or Indian Tribes in a number of Indian water rights cases.
Given the importance of the issues raised here for the on-going development of water law, the
Journal is planning a later issue which will more fully develop the debate as to how one "appropriately" measures economic feasibility, involving scholars who have considered this problem from
divergent points of view.

H. S. Burness,* R. G. Cummings,*
W. D. Gorman,** and R. R. Lansford**

The "New" Arizona v. California:
Practicably Irrigable Acreage and
Economic Feasibility
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arizona v. California case was reopened for the purpose of adjudicating water rights for omitted and boundary lands on the several
Indian Reservations. The Master's Report in this case has been submitted
to the U.S. Supreme Court.I While the Court has yet to act on specific
recommendations in the Master's Report, principles for interpreting the
practicably irrigable acreage rule for quantifying the Indian's reserved
(Winters) water rights adopted by the Master are of interest given their
potential for establishing important precedent in water rights law. In this
regard, and briefly stated, the Master concludes that: "For present purposes, a finding that annual benefits exceed costs will suffice for afinding
of practicableirrigability(emphasis added)." 2
Thus, economic feasibility is established as the means for demonstrating practicably irrigable acreage3 which, in turn, serves to quantify water
reserved to the tribes. In setting this standard, the Special Master dem*Department of Economics, University of New Mexico.
**Department of Agricultural Economics, New Mexico State University.
1. In the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1981, Arizona v. California et al,
Report of Elbert P. Tuttle, Special Master, February 22, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as Master's
Report 1982).
2. Id. at 100; See also 94-100.
3. ". . . practicably irrigable . . . very nearly means economically feasible;" id. at 94.
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onstrated (in our view) a remarkable facility in grasping the subtlety of
relevant economic concepts in his analysis of testimony. Regretably, however, testimony from only one economic expert4 precluded his consideration of at least three important and controversial aspects of benefitcost studies (most commonly used for measuring economic feasibility)
which will surely be at issue in later cases. These aspects may be critical
in choosing the structure of a benefit-cost study that will provide measures
for economic feasibility which ". . . most nearly adhere to the law... "
and include: the distinction between economic feasibility and financial
feasibility; criteria which determine the scope of included benefits and
costs; and criteria for discounting methods. In what follows we provide
the reader with a brief sketch of issues relevant for those topics.
II. FINANCIAL VERSUS ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY
The Special Master had little trouble in recognizing the general distinction between economic and financial feasibility; thus, we have but a
few clarifying comments to offer. Among his several observations in this
regard, 6 in discussing the interest rate the Master concludes: "Because
this was an economic analysis, the goal was not to determine the interest
rate at which money could actually be borrowed. The United States, I
believe, chose the correct approach, because the question of practicable
irrigability turns upon economic rather than financial analysis." 7
Thus, in looking to economic feasibility-as opposed to financial feasibility which centers on the repayment issue-as indicative of a "practical" irrigation project, the Master follows the long-established precedent
in U.S. reclamation policy wherein the assessment of a project's economic
feasibility is an issue separate from (and first in priority to) issues related
to repayment.8 Thus, Leavitt Act provisions (for Indian projects) and
"excess" power revenues (for non-Indian projects) are relevant for repayment considerations but are not relevant for the assessment of economic feasibility.9 Unfortunately, our earlier exposition concerning the
appropriate role of Leavitt Act provisions in feasibility analysis" ° was
seemingly unclear, leading the Master to conclude that our theme sug4. Id. at 141.
5. Id. at 95.
6. See, e.g., id. at 95-96 and 141.
7. Id. at 167.
8. This point is developed in § 3 of Bumess, Cummings, Gorman, and Lansford, U.S. Reclamation Policy and Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RES. J.807-26 (1980) (hereinafter Burness):
" ..it was clear that reimbursement was not to be used as a criterion for project feasibility" at
814.
9. See the Master's rejection of the use of subsidies for purposes of demonstrating economic
feasibility in Master's Report 1982, supra note 1,at 95-96.
10. Burness, supra note 8, at 824.
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gested the use of Leavitt Act deferment provisions as social benefits to
offset project costs." It is important that this issue be clarified. Use of
Leavitt Act provisions (or "excess" power revenues) in an assessment of
"...such
economic feasibility has no foundation in theory or precedent,
2
considerations."'
repayment
of
independent
is
assessment
III. THE SCOPE OF BENEFITS AND COSTS
In terms of the scope of benefits and costs to be included in a study
of economic feasibility, the most important issue is whether or not "secondary" benefits (and, it is to be understood, costs) are to be included.
As distinguished from "primary" benefits (also called "direct" and/or
National Economic Development, NED, benefits), usually measured as
the increase in net farm income attributable to the irrigation project,
secondary benefits are the increases in income and employment in other
sectors of the economy that result from (for example) the increase in the
project farmer's purchases of household items as well as machinery,
equipment, fertilizers, etc. As long as the economy is not fully employed,
such "secondary" increases in income that are induced by primary benefits
may be regarded as every bit as much a social benefit as primary benefits
and, properly measured, are included in the analysis of economic feasibility. Obviously, if the economy is fully employed, the project farmer's
purchase of, for example, a tractor would not result in the economy's
production of another tractor-the farmer's purchase would simply displace (at a likely cost in inflation) some other farmer's purchase of a
tractor. In the case of full employment neither secondary nor primary (in
many cases) 3 benefits would attend the project-resources would simply
be shifted from one use to another with no net gain in employment or
incomes.
Secondary benefits were apparently not included in measures for economic feasibility put before the Master in the new Arizona v. California
case, and the rationale for their exclusion involves an interesting issue
for Indian water rights cases. Prior to 1973, direct and secondary benefits
were used in all economic feasibility studies for reclamation projects. On
the average, secondary benefits accounted for some 40% of agricultural
benefits claimed for BuRec projects during this period. " Referring to
Table 1, only six of the 28 projects built during this period in the Rocky
11. Master's Report 1982, supra note 1, at 96 n. 17.
12. Burness, supra note 8, at 824.
13. Primary and secondary benefits can result in the full employment case when resources are
shifted to higher valued uses, as in the case of primary benefits where land is put under irrigation.
In a strictly technical sense, this would not be the full-employment case inasmuch as some resourceswater-were not fully employed.
14. Burness, supra note 8, at 819, Table 2.
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TABLE 1
Historical Measures for Benefit-Cost Ratios

Project

Direct
Agricultural
Benefits Only

Direct and
Secondary Benefits

Angostura
Bluff
Boysen
Canyon Ferry
Crow Creek
East Branch
Eden
Ft. Clark
Garrison
Glendo
Hanover
Heart Butte
Helena Valley
Lyman
Navajo
Oahe
Owl Creek
Preston Bench
Provo River
Rapid Valley
San Felipe
San Juan-Chama
Seedskadee
Shadehill
Shoshone
Vale
Weber
Yellowtail
AVERAGE
(Number of Projects)
RANGE:

.36
.45
.77
.59
.34
.95
.53
.41
1.15
1.51
.43
.61
.59
.60
.31
1.32
.49
.34
1.08
.32
1.87
.55
.52
.57
.39
1.80
.96
.51
.72
(28)
.31-1.87

.90
1.45
.78
1.46
.76
1.93
1.17
.73
2.26
1.47
1.74
1.42
1.42
.79
1.03
2.20
.94
.34
1.88
1.58
2.71
1.02
1.54
1.11
1.34
2.33
1.50
.92
1.38
(28)
.34-2.71

Source: Data from studies prepared by the Bureau of Reclamation; values in these studies are adjusted
to constant 1978 dollars.
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Mountain and Pick-Sloan regions would have passed the Master's test
for practicable irrigability without the inclusion of secondary benefits. 5
In 1973 the Water Resources Council (WRC) published its principles and
standards for analyzing the economic feasibility of water and land-related
projects,' 6 and the general policy of the United States attorneys has been
that prevailing WRC guidelines are to be followed in preparing measures
for economic feasibility. Secondary benefits are not included in benefitcost measures under the WRC's 1973 (and later amended) 7 guidelines
and, therefore, were not included in measures put before the Master in
this case. The exclusion of secondary benefits from WRC-mandated benefit-cost measures results from a critical assumption-recognized by the
WRC as "somewhat arbitrary"' -required by the WRC for benefit-cost
studies, viz., one must assume that the economy is fully employed.' 9
The relevance of the above for the rule by which economic feasibility
implies practicably irrigable acreage is then immediately apparent:
what scope of benefits is appropriate for demonstrating economic feasibility? Prior to 1973, during which the bulk of Western waters were
developed, full employment was not assumed and economic feasibility
encompassed secondary benefits; between 1973-1982, full employment became a required planning assumption and secondary benefits
were excluded from measures of economic feasibility. Oddly enough,
the economy was more fully employed during the 1960-1973 period,
when the average unemployment rate was 4.9%, than after the time
at which the full employment assumption was required-the average
unemployment rate between 1973 and 1980 was 6.8%. With the planned
dismantling of the WRC, 2 ° planning standards for 1982 and the future
may or may not require the full employment assumption; at this point,
standards are simply unclear.
Given, as shown above, that planning standards change from time to
time, and that the effects of such changes vis-a-vis the substance of benefitcost measures may not be trivial, 2' the equity implications of measuring
the feasibility of a right which is "reserved" through time with standards

15. Of the 28 constructed projects, eight fail the test with secondary benefits when values are
adjusted to 1978 dollars; in current dollars, however, most projects had benefit-cost ratios greater
than I when secondary benefits are included.
16. Economic Feasibility Standards, 38 Fed. Reg. 24, 777 (1973).
17. Amendments to Economic Feasibility Standards, 45 Fed. Reg. Part 11,Sec. 711.61 (1980).
18. Id. at 64,384; see response to Comment No. 202 at 64384.
19. 38 Fed. Reg., supra note 16, and 45 Fed. Reg., supra note 17; see particularly WRC response
to Comment No. 127, at 64379.
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 12,296 (1982).
21. This point is forcefully made by comparing pre-1973 and post-1973 benefit-cost measures
given in Table I.
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extant at a particular moment in time 22 pose an (as yet) unanswered
challenge in water rights law.
IV. DISCOUNTING METHODS
There is probably no topic in economics about which more has been
written, and less understood, than the question as to how one chooses
an appropriate rate of discount. In the case at hand, the United States'
economist is reported to have stated that the federal discount rate is
commonly used for economic analyses. 23 The term "federal discount rate"
is ambiguous24 and may refer to the Federal Reserve's discount rate, the
OMB-mandated discount or, most likely, the discount rate required by
the WRC which is, for obvious reasons, the rate commonly used for
assessing federal projects. The fact that the WRC discount rate is commonly used for federal reclamation projects (indeed, its use for such
purposes is mandated by Congress)25 does not, however, make its use
unequivocally appropriate for determining practicably irrigable acreage.
Given the space allowed here, we can only touch on this extraordinarily
complex issue; we hope to give the subject more comprehensive treatment
in a later work. However, the following are a few of the major issues
relevant for considerations regarding an "appropriate" discount rate.
(a) the discount rate must be a real, inflation-free rate; as recognized
by the WRC,26 the WRC rate (used in the new Arizona v. California) is
not a real rate.
(b) in cases where streams of benefit/costs affecting future needs across
multiple, future generations are involved in an analysis of economic
feasibility, serious questions arise as to the ethical implications of discounting.27
(c) widely different ranges for "appropriate" social discount rates depend on one's assumptions as to whether consumption or investment is
displaced by the project.
22. The WRC's 1973 standards made explicit that such standards were subject to change as the
WRC determines that "... experience, research, and planning conditions dictate," 45 Fed. Reg.,
supra note 17, at § 716.6.
23. Master's Report 1982, supra note I, at 167.
24. It is likely, and understandable, that the U.S. economist's precise jargon was slightly altered
in the Master's Report.
25. Act of August 4, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-260, 53 Stat. 1187 (1939).
26. U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, OPTIONS FOR THE DISCOUNT RATE 15 (Nov.
1975).
27. As one example, see Schulze, Brookshire, and Sandier, The Social Role of Discount for
Nuclear Waste Storage: Economics or Ethics?, 21 NAT. RES. J. 811-32 (1981). Indeed, the "future
needs" dimension of reserved rights raises questions as to the appropriateness of benefit/cost analysis
per se as a means for demonstrating feasibility.
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(d) computational issues raise a host of other conceptual problems,
not the least of which are those associated with the question as to how
risk and taxes are to be treated in the selection of a social discount rate.

